Locked on your phone
Your phone locks the record itself, before anything is sent. What reaches the internet is a string of characters nobody can make sense of
A passport, an insurance policy, an email password reach the internet already locked. Below is how that works: first in plain words, then for those who want a look inside.
Updated 18 November 2026
In short
Your phone locks the record itself, before anything is sent. What reaches the internet is a string of characters nobody can make sense of
By default we keep a copy of the key, as Google Drive and iCloud do. Change phones and your records stay with you
With “Only I hold the key”, not even we can open your records. The flip side: lose the recovery code and there is nothing we can do to help
01
Like a left-luggage office: you hand over a locked suitcase and keep the key
Say you photograph your passport. For now it's an ordinary photo, and only your phone has it.
The app locks the record with a key it created itself on your phone. The key sits in protected storage — the same place banking apps keep theirs.
The record travels to the server over a protected connection. Even if someone intercepted it on the way, all they'd find inside is a jumble of characters.
On the server the records stay just as locked as when they arrived. Our servers are in the European Union, in Belgium.
The server hands the record back just as locked, and it's your device that opens it. On a computer or a new phone the Safe will ask you to confirm it's you: with a code from an email or, in “Only I hold the key” mode, with the recovery code. After that the key appears there too.
Records shared with your partner have a key of their own, one for the two of you. Your partner's copy is locked so that only their device can open it. Your personal records, though, stay closed to them: they have no key for those.
02
A lock is only as good as the hiding place of its key. So the main question about any protection is who holds it. In the Safe, you decide.
on from the start
turned on in “Protection”
Like a spare key to your flat left with the concierge
PlusChanged phones, confirmed with a code from an email, and everything is there
PriceTechnically, we are able to open your records. But the spare key is stored apart from them, and we release it in one case only: you request it yourself from your own account, and we send a code to the email address you registered with. Only once that code is entered is the key released.
Like a safe whose only key is yours
PlusWe can't open your records — not on our own, not at anyone's demand
PriceLose both your phone and the recovery code and nobody can bring the records back, us included
The recovery code appears only on your phone's screen. We never receive it, and it isn't sent by email.
Standard protection is enough for most people: it helps when a phone is lost. “Only I hold the key” is worth turning on for what no one else should ever see — if you're ready to keep the recovery code apart from your phone.
03
Four digits, a fingerprint or Face ID at the door of the Safe. It protects against whoever picks up your unlocked phone.
Ten wrong attempts and the phone erases the key. The records themselves aren't going anywhere: they're on the server, and the Safe will open again with a code from an email or, in “Only I hold the key” mode, with the recovery code.
04
Services that store your data fall into two kinds, depending on who holds the key
Google Drive and Photos · iCloud in standard mode · Dropbox · Notion
You can read it and, technically, so can the service
Lose access — they can help you get it back
1Password · Bitwarden · Signal · Telegram secret chats · iCloud with Advanced Data Protection
Only you can read it
Lose the code — the data can't be recovered
Neither kind is better than the other: the first guards against loss, the second against other people's eyes
Even in standard mode the Safe differs from Google Drive: Drive locks a file once it is on its server, while the Safe locks it on your phone, before sending.
05
Sign in to Enfolk on the new phone and confirm the Safe with a code from an email — your records are there. If “Only I hold the key” is on, you'll need the recovery code instead of the email.
Tap “Forgot the code?”: we'll email you a code and you set new digits. With “Only I hold the key” you need the recovery code instead of the email. If you don't have that either, the Safe has to be started over, and the old records are lost.
If the entry code is off, the Safe opens like any other section. If it's on, they get ten attempts, after which the key is erased from the phone.
In standard mode that is dangerous: with access to your email they can sign in to your account and request the Safe's key — as with almost any service. Turn on two-step sign-in for your email. With “Only I hold the key” email alone isn't enough: without the recovery code the Safe won't open.
In standard mode your records are only as protected as the server: the locked records and the spare keys are both stored with us, though separately. With “Only I hold the key” an attacker walks away with locked records only — and nothing to open them.
Any time, in “Protection”. Turn on “Only I hold the key” and we delete our spare key while you get a recovery code. Turn it off and the spare key is stored with us again.
As long as the Safe is open on at least one of your devices, everything can be fixed: issue a new code (“Protection” → “New recovery code”) or turn off “Only I hold the key”. But if you have no code and the Safe isn't open anywhere — say, the phone is lost — the records can't be recovered and the Safe has to be started over. So keep the code somewhere other than your phone.
There is one Safe for all your devices: the same records in the app and in the browser. Sign in to the same account and confirm with a code from an email — or with the recovery code if “Only I hold the key” is on. The four digits for entry are separate on each device.
Shared records are protected the way the partner with the simpler mode is protected. If one of you uses standard mode, we hold that person's spare key, and through it there is a path to the pair key too. Each person's personal records are protected by their own mode.
06
Every protection ends somewhere. Better to know in advance where.
Next — for specialists
The same thing in the language of engineers: which algorithms, where the keys live, and what the protection can't stop
There are no secrets here that would help an attacker, and there can't be: sound protection doesn't depend on nobody knowing how it's built. That's how banks and messengers work too.
Records and photos are encrypted before sending. The server receives and stores only ciphertext.
Only open standards and proven libraries — the same ones large services use. No homemade cryptography.
The entry code and the recovery code are created and stay on the device. They never reach the server or an email.
Everything rests on one key — the Safe key. The other keys exist to store its copies safely.
Keychain · Keystore256 bits, random, created on the deviceAES-256-GCMstandard protection“Only I hold the key”The Safe key is 256 random bits. It is created on the device the first time you open the Safe and encrypts every record and every photo.
On the phone the key lives in the system's secure storage: Keychain on iPhone, Keystore on Android. The app gets it from the system when it opens the Safe.
In standard mode a copy of the Safe key is encrypted with a separate spare key. The spare key sits on the server in a closed store the apps have no access to. The server releases it only on a request from your account, and only after a one-time code sent to the account's email. So the server has everything needed to decrypt the Safe. We don't hide that: recovery rests on it.
In “Only I hold the key” mode a copy of the Safe key is encrypted with a key derived from the recovery code. The code is 40 random characters, created on the device and never leaving it. When the mode is turned on, the spare key on the server is deleted.
The Safe key does not change when you switch modes. So records made before “Only I hold the key” was turned on are protected by that mode less strongly than new ones.
Every record and every photo is encrypted with AES-256-GCM. This mode doesn't just hide the content, it also puts an integrity seal on it: if a record on the server is swapped or damaged by even one bit, the app notices and won't open it.
Each encryption uses its own random one-time value. So two identical records look completely different on the server, and nothing in the ciphertext reveals that they match.
Same as: iCloud, 1Password, Google DriveShared records are encrypted with a separate couple key. One of you creates it and passes it to the other in a wrapper only the recipient can open.
The wrapper comes from a X25519 (Curve25519) key exchange: each of you has your own key pair, the public half is on the server, the private half stays on the device. The private half reaches the server only locked with the Safe key, which is how the pair key is restored on a new device. From its own private key and the other's public key, both devices derive the same wrapper, while the server, which holds only the public halves, can't. So shared records are protected by the simpler mode of the two: in the standard mode we hold a spare Safe key. Personal records are encrypted with the Safe key and are not available to your partner.
Same as: Signal, WhatsAppOn the phone the code is a lock in front of the system storage, not a cipher: the device itself guards the Safe key. After the tenth wrong attempt the app erases the key from that device.
In a browser there is no system storage. The key sits in browser storage, encrypted with a key derived from the code through the slow function PBKDF2. That's better than nothing, but four digits are not a password. In a browser the main protection is locking your computer and signing out on other people's devices.
Between the app and the server there is TLS, the same protected connection banks and email use. It's a second layer: records already travel encrypted.
Our servers are in the European Union, in Google Cloud in Belgium; there Google also encrypts the disks, on top of our encryption.
Encryption hides the content, not the fact of storage. This stays visible in either mode:
The title, text, fields and photos of records are always encrypted
An honest table of what each mode withstands
| Threat | Standard protection | Only I hold the key |
|---|---|---|
| Someone intercepts data in transit | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| Records leak from the server | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| The whole server is breached, spare keys included | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| Someone gets into your email | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| Someone demands that we open your records | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| A stranger holding your unlocked phoneProtects if the entry code is on | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
| Malware on your deviceNo encryption helps against an infected device: the program sees what you see. | Standard protectionProtectsDoesn't protectPartly | Only I hold the keyProtectsDoesn't protectPartly |
This page is checked against the app's code. When the protection changes, so will the page.
Back to topUpdated 18 November 2026